The merger came at the right time for Chrysler, according to Susan Jacobs of Jacobs & Associates:
The US market is saturated, and the company’s only avenue for growth is overseas. Chrysler has only 1% market share in Europe. Jacobs also believed that Chrysler’s brands – Jeep, Dodge and Plymouth – could break into markets that were closed to Mercedes. C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics in Washington DC, saw the merger as a “win-win proposition”, believing it would improve the efficiency of the two companies. Instead of one partner being “rescued” by the merger, the DaimlerChrysler union was seen as a merger of equals, prompted not by necessity but by opportunity, at least superficially. Daimler-Benz was known for its engineering skill and Chrysler was known for innovation, speed in product development and bold marketing. Chrysler and Daimler-Benz products were complementary with little overlap. Moreover, potential growth opportunities for the non-automotive businesses, such as services (particularly financial) and aerospace, could be exploited. Daimler-Benz and Chrysler were keen to enhance their financial standing, broaden their access to intellectual capital and increase their strategic options. The merger, theoretically at least, was a good idea. So what were the difficulties?
